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Avenal v. State: Takings and Damagings in Louisiana
John J. Costonis*
1. INTRODUCTION
Choosing non-constitutional grounds to resolve controversies that
pose difficult constitutional issues is a time-honored judicial practice.
The judiciary's principal task, after all, is to decide the case before it.
Admirable for its prudence, the practice nonetheless delays evolution
of doctrine in areas that merit serious judicial attention.
Judicial silence shifts attention from the constitutional issue to the
rationale the court employed to avoid it. Does the rationale contain
clues suggesting an eventual outcome for the issue? No longer
responsible for resolving it on the merits, judges often permit
themselves--or are permitted by their colleagues-to speak more
expansively in dicta. Is the rationale neutral, or does it instead add or
subtract elements that, perhaps unsuspected by their author, cause the
original constitutional issue to morph into something different?
These questions leap to the fore in the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision, Avenal v. State,' a class action involving over two hundred
oyster leases, thousands of acres of leased state water bottoms, and
more than $1 billion in damage awards.2 Avenal's issue, as framed
in Louisiana and in companion federal litigation, was whether a state
coastal restoration project diminishing the leases' value was a
"taking" of the lessees' property under article 1, section 4 of the
Louisiana Constitution.' The project's diversion of fresh water from
the Mississippi River over the leased acreage reduced the water's
salinity to levels unsustainable for oyster culture.
The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state, but
avoided the constitutional issue by validating a clause featured in
Copyright 2005, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 2004), 886 So. 2d 1085.
2. See Jeffrey Meitrodt & Aaron Kuriloff, Shell Games, Times Picayune (New
Orleans), May 4, 2003, at A- 18 (National).
3. See La. Const. art. I, § 4(A) ("Every person has the right to acquire, own,
control, use, enjoy, protect and dispose of private property. This right is subject to
• . . the reasonable exercise of the police power."); La. Const. art. I, § 4(B)
("Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state.. . except for public purposes
and with just compensation .... [T]he owner shall be compensated to the full
extent of his loss.").
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most of the leases that held the state harmless for losses associated
with its project.4 This essay's concern, however, is the basis upon
which the Court disposed of the balance of the takings claims. It held
that because Avenal's factual scenario raised not the takings, but the
"damagings" issue,5 the action was prescribed under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5624.6
Prescription enabled the Court to sidestep the merits of this
inverse condemnation action. It also encouraged Justice Victory,
writing for the majority, and Justice Weimer, concurring, to forecast
and perhaps reformulate in dicta the likely direction of the Louisiana
inverse condemnation doctrine, as well as to profile key parallels and
differences between its former version and federal counterpart.7
A. The Takings/Damagings Roadmap
Part II of this article explores this contribution, which corrects a
variety of misconceptions advanced in Avenal's appellate court
opinions. It constructs a roadmap that outlines the various categories
of federal inverse condemnation actions under the Federal
Constitution's Fifth Amendment, compares them to Louisiana
Constitution, article 1, section 4 actions, and assesses the supposed
differences between federal and state law advanced by Avenal's
appellate court.
The section also probes the likelihood that the Louisiana Supreme
Court may indeed have poured new wine into old bottles by excluding
from its damagings analysis any consideration of whether Louisiana
had expropriated or was itself the owner of the diversion project.8
4. Avenal, 886 So. 2d at 1099.
5. Id. at 1109-10.
6. Id. See also La. R.S. 9:5624 (2004). For a further discussion of this
statute, see infra notes 90-110 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 60-63, 150 and accompanying text.
8. The reason for this exclusion appears directly linked to the roles played by
the federal government and Louisiana in the acquisition of the project site, in the
project's construction, and in the project's operation. As stated by the Federal
Claims Court, the diversion project "for purposes of this case, was federal in
nature." Avenal v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 778 (Fed Cl. 1995), aff'd on other
grounds, 100 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The project was authorized by Congress,
which appropriated funds for the project. See Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073
(1965); Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1986). Louisiana entered into a
compact with the federal government in 1987 that obligated the state to maintain
and operate the project following completion of construction; to be responsible for
twenty-five percent of the project's construction costs; and to indemnify the federal
government for damages arising from the construction, operation or maintenance
of the project. Avenal, 39 Fed. Cl. 778. The state met the last of these requirements
by inserting into leases executed in 1985 and later the hold harmless clause that
resulted in the denial of most of the claims by the Louisiana Supreme Court. See
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The classical paradigm for damagings demands that the injury
inflicted on adjacent or nearby private property must be preceded by
the government's prior expropriation of the site sponsoring the
injury.9 If so, the inquiry then shifts to whether the injury at the
private site qualifies as a constitutional damaging. If Avenal signals
the demise of the prior expropriation element, the roadmap will have
to be redrawn to recognize the birth of a novel cause of action for
constitutional damagings in Louisiana.
B. "Damagings " in Louisiana
Part III targets a variety of conundrums associated with the
damagings issue in Louisiana and in other states. Excluding the prior
expropriation requirement, these concerns predate Avenal. But
A venal's elevation of the damagings issue to front rank in Louisiana's
inverse condemnation doctrine and likely modification of the
damagings action make clarification or, in some cases, reformulation
of a variety of the damagings issue's facets even more imperative.
These facets are outlined below.
1. The Prior Expropriation Issue
Leading the list is the prior expropriation requirement that the
Louisiana Supreme Court may have modified by categorizing Avenal
as a damagings dispute. The issue can be posed from two angles.
One has already been identified: if a damagings action requires a
determination that government must previously have expropriated its
own site, does Avenal's exclusion of this element from its damagings
analysis birth a novel inverse condemnation cause of action for
Louisiana?
The second observes that takings occur in a single step. Whether
the step that produces the injury is a regulation, a physical invasion,
Avenal, 886 So. 2d at 1102. The state did not expropriate the project site since the
cooperation agreement obligated the federal government to acquire private lands;
the state only had to tender state-owned lands free of encumbrances. See e-mail
from Andrew Wilson, Counsel in the Avenal proceedings for the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources to John Costonis (Feb. 3, 2005) (on file with
author). In consequence, title to the project site is held by the federal government.
To sum up, Louisiana neither expropriated nor holds title to the project site; it is
responsible, however, for operating and maintaining the diversion project. The
oyster lessees' challenge, the Louisiana Supreme Court is careful to point out,
addresses the "operation" of the project, not its ownership or construction. Avenal,
886 So. 2d at 1088, 1095 (emphasis added). In -light of these facts, it is clear that
A venal deviates significantly from the classical paradigm for damagings actions as
that paradigm is fully developed in the text at infra notes 35-40.
9. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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or something else, the government's prior behavior is of no import.
Illustrative are the Avenal opinions in the fourth circuit below" and
the companion case in the federal courts." Having accepted the
oyster lessees' characterization of Avenal as a takings dispute, these
courts had no reason to address how the diversion project site was
acquired.
Takings, however, also contrast with damagings by the degree or
character of the injury suffered. In fact, the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated in Avenal itself that a taking requires the government's
acquisition of "the right of ownership or one of its recognized
dismemberments," while a damaging occurs when the "action of the
public authority results in the diminution of the value of the
property.' 2 The key inquiry under this approach is simply to
determine whether the dispute fits into the first or the second of these
boxes. This inquiry, which in fact dominated the Louisiana Supreme
Court's analysis ofAvenal's takings/damagings problem, ignores the
manner in which the state acquired the site of its alleged damaging
actions. This apparent unbundling of the prior expropriation
requirement from the former damagings paradigm conceivably
introduces a damagings action that will be analyzed in a manner
similar to that employed for partial takings under the federal inverse
condemnation doctrine. 3 Alternatively, it may be termed an instance
of "condemnation by nuisance."' 4
2. Inverse Condemnation and Conventional Actions:
Exclusive, Overlapping, or Blended?
The second issue concerns where and how to draw the line
between inverse condemnation actions, whether takings or
damagings, and conventional actions in tort, nuisance, or property.
The problem is not Louisiana's alone. Arvo Van Alstyne, for
example, could have been describing the Louisiana picture in his
account of the problem in California:
The law of inverse condemnation liability.., is entangled in
a complex web of doctrinal threads. The stark California
constitutional mandate that just compensation be paid when
private property is taken 'or damaged' for public use has
10. Avenal v. State, 01-0843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003), 858 So. 2d 697.
11. Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
12. A venal, 886 So. 2d at 1105 (quoting Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v.
Hoyt, 215 So. 2d 114, 120 (La. 1968)).
13. For a further discussion of the partial takings doctrine, see infra notes
22-35 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
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induced courts, for want of more precise guidance, to invoke
analogies drawn from the law of torts and property as keys to
liability. The decisional law, therefore, contains numerous
allusions to concepts of 'nuisance,' 'trespass,' and
'negligence,' as well as to notions of strict liability without
fault. Unfortunately, judicial opinions seldom seek to
reconcile these divergent approaches. . . . Clarification
would ...be desirable in order to mark the borderline
between the presently overlapping, and hence confusing, rules
governing governmental tort and inverse condemnation
liabilities ...."
One facet of the line-drawing issue is whether factual disputes that
coincide with the constitutional damagings format may nonetheless be
litigated as the conventional actions to which they are often analogized.
If a private party rather than the state diverted water over his neighbor's
leased oyster beds with the toxic effects recorded in Avenal, for
example, he might incur liability under Louisiana Civil Code Article
667, which forbids him to "make any work on [his estate] which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may
be the cause of any damage to him. 16 Could Avenal's oyster lessees
have ignored the Louisiana Constitution altogether and framed their
claim exclusively as a conventional action under Article 667?
Suppose, further, that arguments exonerating the state are available
under the inverse condemnation format, but are excluded from the
conventional format and that the state would be liable under the latter
but not the former. The query again is whether the private claimant
may opt solely for the conventional format.
15. Arvo Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: UnintendedPhysicalDamage,
20 Hastings L.J. 431, 431-32 (1968-1969).
16. Article 667 is the most frequently cited alternative or complement to article
1, section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution in decisions standing at the interface
between conventional and damaging actions. For the leading cases, see infra notes
127-145 and accompanying text. The article's selection undoubtedly traces to the
similarity of the factual scenarios prescribed in the article and what this essay labels
"injurious affection" actions, namely activity by the owner of one site-the
government in the case ofthe injurious affection action-that injuriously affects the
holder of a property interest on a nearby site-the private party alleging the
damaging in that action. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. But article
667's traditional role in this relationship has arguably been modified and perhaps
even eliminated by an amendment in 1996 converting from strict liability to
negligence actions all proceedings other than those premised on ultra-hazardous
activities, which are defined to include only pile driving and blasting with
explosives. William Crawford, Tort Law §§ 18.18-18.23, in 12 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (2000). Negligent acts, however, are actionable only as torts, not as
constitutional damagings in Louisiana. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying
text.
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These questions are not fanciful, as Avenal itself illustrates.
Article 1, Section 4 exonerates the state from liability for a taking
or damaging if its act is a "reasonable exercise of the police power."
Forceful dicta of Justices Victory and Weimer indicate that had the
Avenal dispute-formatted as a damagings action-been decided on
its merits, the state's police power arguments would have
prevailed. 7  But the police power rationale is foreign to
conventional actions, which measure the jural relations between the
state and private parties on the same basis as those between
contending private parties alone.
The line-drawing problem reappears in a second guise that,
while formally different, raises essentially the same questions as the
first. Suppose the dispute is styled as a constitutional damagings
action. May it nonetheless be resolved on the basis of conventional
principles so that the state's obligations will be measured, again, by
a yardstick pertaining to private parties?
Should Avenal's oyster lessees, for example, have been able to
insist that the state's constitutional damaging liability should be
measured by whether or not a private party would be liable under
Civil Code article 667 for like behavior? This question is better
posed as two separate questions. Will the State avoid liability in the
constitutional action if the private actor would not be liable under
article 667? Conversely, will the State be liable in the
constitutional action if the private actor would be liable under the
article?
These questions are considerably more complex than their
treatment in Louisiana cases suggests, as Part III will detail. Even
if the State would not be liable if a private party would not be liable,
the article 667 analysis should only be the first step of a larger
constitutional inquiry.'8 Likewise, proof that a private party is
liable does not by itself establish state liability. Measuring jural
relations between the State and a private party by those between
private parties ignores the police power's central role in the former
calculus, as noted above. Looking again to Avenal to illustrate the
question, can the State's liability to the oyster lessees be established
simply by showing that the diversion project, if conducted by a
private party, violates article 667? Or is a second step necessary:
namely, refuting the State's response that its diversion project is a
"reasonable exercise of the police power" that overrides the oyster
lessees' article 667 property right? 9
17. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
19. The same police power/private right conflict discussed in text arises under
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3. Title 9, Section 5624 's Role in Inverse Condemnation
Damagings Actions
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 provides that "[w]hen private
property is damaged for public purposes, any and all actions for such
damages are prescribed by the prescription of two years, which shall
begin to run after the completion and acceptance of the public
works." The statute engages our attention because it has been the
focus of more judicial discussion exploring the
damagings/conventional action link than the relatively few damagings
decisions addressing this topic.
Part I probes two questions relating to the statute. The first is
whether the statute bears the exclusive relationship to constitutional
damagings that Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5111 bears to
constitutional takings. 2' The second assumes a negative response. It
asks whether the statute should be amended to limit its coverage
solely to article 1, section 4 damagings actions and a second statute
adopted that would be reserved solely for conventional actions for
public works damages. These actions would treat damagings in parity
with takings and separate constitutional from conventional actions.
the Federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment. Instructive for the resolution of
Avenal's conflict between the state's interest in coastal restoration and the oyster
fishermen's enjoyment of their leases is the lucid description of the conflict's
jurisprudential structure in the United States Supreme Court's decision, United
States v. Willow River Power Co., in which the federal government's navigation
servitude was held to supervene a power company's right to the unimpeded flow of
waters from its dam:
Rights, property or otherwise, which are absolute against all the world are
certainly rare, and water rights are not among them. Whatever rights may
be as between equals such as riparian owners, they are not the measure of
riparian rights on a navigable stream relative to the function of the
Government in improving navigation. Where these interests conflict they
are not to be reconciled as between equals, but the private interest must
give way to a superior right, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say
that as against the Government such private interest is not a right at all.
324 U.S. 499, 510, 65 S. Ct. 761, 767 (1945) (emphasis added).
Parallel reasoning, premised explicitly on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.
Ct. 2886 (1992) leads Justice Victory, in dictum, to the conclusion that
"compensation is not owed [to the oyster lessees] because no legally existing rights
were being taken under those circumstances." Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La.
2004), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1107 n.28.
20. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5111 not only establishes a prescriptive
period for takings as Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 does for damagings, but
addresses a variety of other matters, including attorney fee awards that the latter
statute ignores. Compare La. R.S. 13:5111 (2004), with La. R.S. 9:5624 (2004).
2005] 1021
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II. TAKINGS AND DAMAGINGS: A ROADMAP FOR LOUISIANA AND
FEDERAL INVERSE CONDEMNATION DOCTRINE
A. Federal Takings Formats
Excluding damagings, which are not recognized as such in the
federal inverse condemnation doctrine, federal courts utilize a catalog
of formats that roughly parallel those employed in Louisiana. Federal
takings may derive either from regulations or from public projects
and other governmental activity. The former are termed regulatory
takings because the restrictions imposed upon private property's use
diminish its value. The latter are deemed physical occupations
because the project typically entails some type of invasion or
occupation of the claimant's land or other property interest.
The regulatory and physical takings formats resolve further into
per se takings and ad hoc takings. A total regulatory taking is a per
se taking. It occurs when a public regulation that deprives the
property of all economic utility cannot be justified as a nuisance-
preventing measure or as firmly warranted under "background
principles of state property law." Illustrative of this format is Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,2' in which the United States
Supreme Court invalidated a coastal regulation preventing an owner
from building on his two vacant seaside lots.
A partial regulatory taking results when a public restriction
severely reduces, but does not eliminate the targeted property's value.
Illustrative is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City ofNew York,22
in which the City's landmarks commission refused to permit
construction of a fifty-two story building in the air rights above Grand
Central Terminal. Conceding its inability to formulate a bright line
test for partial regulatory takings, the United States Supreme Court
settled instead for an ad hoc approach, addressing such factors as the
"character of the governmental action," "the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
governmental action has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations."23
The last element proved decisive in the Court's refusal to find a
taking. Grand Central Terminal was built in 1902 as a railroad station
featuring various ancillary commercial uses, and has not only
continued to function in that capacity, but still generates a reasonable
return for its owner. Construction of an office tower above the
terminal, on the other hand, derived not from these prior investment-
21. 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
22. 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
23. Id. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659.
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backed expectations, but from the company's desire to cash in on a
speculative real estate opportunity unrelated to the Terminal's
traditional function.
Physical occupations may either be permanent or temporary.
Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp.24 teaches that
permanent physical occupations are per se takings under the Fifth
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court declared a statute a
taking that authorized cable companies to permanently affix cable
boxes to the roofs of Manhattan apartment buildings.25  Non-
permanent occupations, like partial regulatory takings, escape
categorical resolution and are addressed on a case-by-case basis in
decisions that scrutinize the activity's impact on the property owner's
right to be free of trespassory incursions.26
B. Louisiana Takings Formats
Louisiana takings law is less well defined than its federal
counterpart. 27 The richest judicial observations often are expressed
only as dicta, as Avenal reflects. They are found not only in
Louisiana Supreme Court opinions, moreover, but scattered
throughout the State's various circuits.
But Louisiana judges are attentive to Federal Fifth Amendment
doctrine28 and often treat federal and state takings law issues in
tandem.29  Likewise, the federal court's key distinction between
24. 458 U.S. 419, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383
(1979) (deeming a public regulation a taking that denied the claimant-developer the
right to exclude the public from boating in his development's private lagoon).
27. Louisiana constitutional jurisprudence, for example, tends to blur the line
between takings and substantive due process by invalidating measures deemed
takings, rather than by awarding compensation, and by using the takings label for
ill-considered measures that fail to accord the injured landowner substantive due
process. See, e.g., Loraine v. City of Baton Rouge, 57 So. 2d 409 (La. 1952);
Pomeroy v. Town of Westlake, 357 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978). Nor does
it define with the same precision as the federal courts the distinctions in text
between categorical and non-categorical regulatory and physical takings although
its approves outcomes that are largely compatible with these labels.
28. An impressive display of the Louisiana Supreme Court's sophisticated
grasp of federal takings law appears in footnote twenty-eight of Justice Victory's
opinion for the Court in Avenal, as complemented by Justice Weimer's
concurrence. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 1080-81, 34 So. 2d 321, 324-25
(La. 1948); Louisiana Seafood Management Council v. Louisiana Wildlife and
Fisheries Comm'n, 97-1367 (La. 1998), 715 So. 2d 387, 392; Layne v. City of
Mandeville, 633 So. 2d 608, 611-12 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 94-
0268 (La. 1994), 635 So. 2d 234; Annison v. Hoover, 517 So. 2d 420, 423 (La.
10232005]
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regulatory and physical takings is commonplace in Louisiana. Partial
regulatory takings will be found in Louisiana when, as stated in the oft-
quoted Annison v. Hoover decision, "there has been a substantial
diminution in value to such an extent that there has been a destruction
of a major portion of the property's value."3° It comes as no surprise
that destruction of the entirety of a parcel's economic value will
amount to a total regulatory taking. Hence, one court's declaration that
a "zoning action which deprives an owner of all practical use of his
property without expropriation and compensation is unconstitutional."3"
The physical taking category appears in decisions confirming that
physical invasions endowing government with the "right of ownership
or one of its recognized dismemberments" are takings.32 Various
factual scenarios define these cases: government may acquire a
parcel's naked ownership but fail to acquire an outstanding lease, 33 for
example, or ma encroach with its project upon a portion of the
claimant's land.'n
But federal and Louisiana law diverge when the "action of the
public authority results in the diminution in the value of the property."
These actions, Avenal instructs, usher us into the realm of Louisiana
damagings law for which there is no direct federal equivalent.
C. Louisiana Damagings Law Format
Key to appreciating this distinctive area of inverse condemnation
doctrine and the classical damagings paradigm discussed earlier is
understanding how the term "damaged" came to join the term "taken"
App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 148 (La. 1988); Standard Materials,
Inc. v. City of Slidell, 96-0684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997), 700 So. 2d 975, 983-84.
It is not uncommon for Louisiana courts addressing article 1, section 4
takings or damagings issues to cite federal authority in support of their holdings.
For example, a state highway plan that blocked access to the developer's
subdivision was deemed a taking in Rivet v. State, 93-369 (La. App. 5th Cir.), 635
So. 2d 295, 297, writ denied, 94-1606 (La. 1994), 646 So. 2d 397. Offered in
support of this holding was the statement in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992), that when state
activity causes a landowner "to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking."
30. 517 So. 2d 420, 423 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 148 (La.
1988).
31. Pomeroy v. Town of Westlake, 357 So. 2d 1299, 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1978).
32. See, e.g., Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. Hoyt, 252 La. 921, 215 So.
2d 114 (1968).
33. Huckabay v. Red River Waterway Comm'n, 27,113 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1995), 663 So. 2d 414; Naquin v. State, 604 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1992).
34. See Roy v. Belt, 2003-1022 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004), 868 So. 2d 209.
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in the Louisiana and many other state constitutions. Projects
occurring on expropriated land may diminish private property
interests on nearby land as well.35 They may do so physically:
flooding of or the deposit of material by a drainage or highway
project are illustrative. They may also do so despite the absence of
trespassory physical contact by, for example, blocking access to
private property by changing the grade of an abutting roadway.
In the pre-damaging clause era, injuries associated with activities
occurring on previously expropriated public lands were deemed
consequential, and hence non-compensable.36 Indeed, a near-
universal principle of nineteenth century federal and state law has
been summarized by the leading eminent domain treatise as follows:
[W]hen [government's] devotion of land to the use for which
it was taken injuriously affects neighboring land, in a manner
that would be actionable at common law if the injury had
been committed by a private individual without legislative
sanction, but does not substantially oust the owner from the
possession or deprive him of all beneficial use thereof, the
owner of the injured land is not entitled to compensation
under the constitution: for merely damaging property does
not necessarily constitute a taking.3
7
Without the damagings language, legislative authorization of
projects that injuriously affect neighboring private property vetoed
35. The term "damagings" as used in the text, excludes severance damages,
which pertain to the devaluation of property remaining with the claimant caused by
the government's expropriation of the balance of its parcel. This article's focus is
on injury suffered on non-expropriated private property in consequence of
construction or the operation of activities on a nearby government-owned site which
the government may have acquired consensually or through the exercise of eminent
domain. However, doctrine arising in a severance context that is nonetheless
common to Louisiana inverse condemnation law generally is discussed when
appropriate to the context. See infra note 40, which addresses the three-pronged
test announced in State v. Chambers Investment Co., 595 So. 2d 598 (La. 1992).
Although portions of the claimant's property had been formally expropriated in
Chambers, the test nonetheless affords the standard format for judicial analysis of
inverse condemnation takings and damagings, and, indeed, served that function in
Justice Victory's Avenal decision, which, however, found it unnecessary to address
all three of Chambers's prongs. See Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 2004), 886
So. 2d 1085, 1104.
36. See Joseph G. Hebert, Comment, Expropriation-ConsequentialDamages
under the Constitution, 19 La. L. Rev. 491, 492-93 (1959). For authoritative
judicial treatment of the evolution of the state constitutional damaging clause and
damaging action, see McMahon v. St. Louis, Ark. & Texas R.R., 41 La. Ann. 827,
6 So. 640 (1889), and Jarnagin v. Highway Comm'n, 5 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1942).
37. Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain § 6.20 (Julius L. Sackman ed., rev.
3d. ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
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claims against the government. Insertion of this language cleared the
way for inverse condemnation actions against these so-called
"injurious affections" by cancelling this veto.38
Damagings language found its way into the Louisiana
Constitution in 1879. 9 A review of the State's inverse condemnation
doctrine since that time reveals eight elements that have met with
judicial approval, although two may prove less robust after Avenal.4 °
Perhaps the most distinctive element of the inverse condemnation
action is the first: governmental activity causing private injury must
be deliberate or occur as a necessary consequence of an activity
serving a public purpose. The constitutional language, "damaging of
private property except for public purposes," the Louisiana Supreme
Court insists, refers "exclusively to the power of eminent domain, i.e.,
the intentional or purposeful expropriation or appropriation of private
property for public use or convenience."'
Second, the act producing the claimed injury must be legislatively
authorized and advance a public purpose.42 Damages resulting from
negligence do not meet the "public purpose" requirement because
negligent acts, according to the courts, do not advance a public
purpose even though the project occasioning them may do so.
38. See Jarnagin, 5 So. 2d at 664.
39. See supra note 36 and cited authority.
40. Avenal, like other inverse condemnation decisions, adverts to the three-
pronged test for takings or damagings advanced in State v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595
So. 2d 592 (La. 1992). See Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 2004), 886 So. 2d
1085, 1104. The elements are a constitutionally protected property interest, damage
in a constitutional sense, and a public purpose sustaining the challenged activity.
Some of the damaging action's elements identified in text can be assimilated to one
of these three headings, but others would be drained of meaning if artificially
compressed in this manner. Unlike Avenal and other damagings cases, moreover,
Chambers engaged a fact situation featuring the expropriation both of the
government's site and of a portion of the claimant's own parcel. Chambers' three
variables are too limited, moreover, to facilitate evaluation of decades of Louisiana
decisions bearing upon the interface between the constitutionally based inverse
condemnation damagings action and conventional actions in tort, nuisance and
property. These observations are advanced with some regret because reducing the
damagings action to Chambers' three elements would enormously simplify the
present inquiry. It would also definitively resolve the prior expropriation issue, see
supra notes 10-14, because prior expropriation by the government of its project site
plays no part in the Chambers formulation.
41. Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 1077, 34 So. 2d 321, 323 (La. 1948)
42. See McMahon v. St. Louis & Ark. & Texas R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 827,
829-30, 6 So. 640, 641 (La. 1889); Jarnagin v. State Highway Comm'n, 5 So. 2d
660,664 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Mathis v. City of DeRidder, 599 So. 2d 378, 391
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).




Third, the injury to the claimant's property rights is their
diminution in value by the public project. Correlatively, the
damagings remedy has traditionally been measured by the monetary
value of the diminution, but is being liberalized in response to the
1974 Constitution's provision that the property owner be
compensated "to the full extent of his loss. '
Fourth, damagings actions are subject to a two-year prescriptive
period.46
Fifth, damages must be special to the claimant's property rather
than general to the community. 47 How this distinction should be
applied in specific instances is a source of continuing controversy.
The factual issues are often complex. Enlarging the properties
deemed damaged, moreover, correspondingly enlarges the project's
public costs. The flooding of a single adjoining parcel by a public
drainage construction project exemplifies the simple case. But how
should the line be drawn in the case of the many victims of access-
blocking highway construction, or, as in Avenal, of diversion projects
impacting thousands of acres of Louisiana's coastal wetlands? A
companion to the special/general distinction is that between remote
damages, which are not compensable, and direct damages, which
are. 48 Again, factual complexity and apprehension of unbounded
public liability guarantee conflict over how damages should be
characterized in particular instances.
Sixth, government will not incur liability for a project or activity
challenged as an inverse condemnation taking or damaging if it
qualifies under Article 1, Section 4 as a "reasonable exercise of the
police power."'49 The reasonableness measure is the same for takings
44. See Reymond v. State, 255 La. 425,451,231 So. 2d 375, 384-85 (1970);
Jarnagin, 5 So. 2d 660, 663 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
45. La. Const. art. 1, § 4(B). See, e.g., State v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So. 2d
598,602 (La. 1992); Huckabay v. Red River Waterway Comm'n, 27,113 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1995), 663 So. 2d 414,424; Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Sewerage and Water Bd.
of City of New Orleans, 1998-0495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), 753 So. 2d 269, 276.
46. See La. R.S. 9:5624 (2004).
47. See, e.g., Constance v. State, 626 So. 2d 1151, 1156 (La. 1993); Reymond,
255 La. at 447-48, 231 So. 2d at 383-84.
48. Reymond, 255 La. at 450, 231 So. 2d at 384; McMahon v. St. Louis, Ark.
& Texas R.R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 827, 831, 6 So. 640, 641-42 (La. 1889).
49. See La. Const. art. 1, § 4(A). In Avenal, this limitation received the
affirmative attention ofJustice Victory and Justice Weimer, both ofwhom reflected
in dicta that the damage suffered by the lessees was non-compensable on police
power grounds. See Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 2004), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1107
n.28 (Victory, J., for the majority), 1115 n.8 (Weimer, J., concurring). Their
endorsement of the non-compensated use of the police power's to avoid imminent
peril or danger is not unique to Louisiana. See, e.g., House v. Los Angeles County
Flood Control Dist., 153 P.2d 950 (1944); Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 163
P. 1024 (1917); Van Alstyne, supra note 15, at 442-47.
20051 1027
8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
and for damagings: do fairness or imperative requirements of public
welfare demand that the costs associated with the governmental
initiative be borne by those immediately impacted by it or, rather, by
the community at large?
While firmly rooted in earlier constitutional jurisprudence, the
final two elements, I believe, should either be reformulated or
abandoned in response both to Avenal and to the larger quest for
coherence in Louisiana's currently disjointed damagings doctrine.
One is the prior condemnation requirement; the second is
employment of rules applicable to private parties in conventional
actions as a yardstick for government's liability in constitutional
damagings actions.
D. Avenal and the Takings/Damagings Issue
Avenal calls to mind an ink blot test that triggers widely different
perceptions. Confronted with the same facts in an action against the
United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit viewed
Avenal as falling short of a partial regulatory taking because the
oyster lessees flunked Penn Central's "distinct investment-backed
expectation" test." The fourth circuit majority opinion shadows
Lucas in finding the equivalent of a total regulatory taking because it
believed that the diversion project completely destroyed the oyster
leases' economic value.5' A fourth circuit concurring opinion evokes
Loretto's permanent physical occupation format by equating the
project's flow of fresh water over the leased bottoms with the paving
over of private land by a highway.52 Blurring the line between
constitutional damagings and conventional actions, a fourth circuit
dissenter insists instead that Avenal is a "delictual" action.53
The last word, of course; goes to the Louisiana Supreme Court:
Avenal is a damaging case.
May the same set of facts reasonably be portrayed as a taking on
the federal plane and as a damaging in Louisiana? Certainly, given
the absence of damaging language in the Fifth Amendment and its
presence in article 1, section 4. Confronted with the injurious
affection format targeted by the damaging language, federal courts
have either rejected the takings claim on the ground that the damages
were "consequential, 54 or liberalized the taking concept so that
Louisiana "damagings" become federal "takings." Arguably, the
50. Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
51. Avenal v. State, 01-0843 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003), 858 So. 2d 697, 705.
52. Id. at 708.
53. Id. at 742-43 (Tobias, J., dissenting).
54. See Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 955, 83 S. Ct. 506 (1963).
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federal court chose the latter course in the companion Avenal
litigation: it equated the dispute with a partial regulatory taking and
resolved it on the Penn Central-basis that the oyster lessees lacked a
distinct investment-backed expectation in pre-project salinity levels."
In his concurring opinion in Avenal, Justice Weimer confirmed
my analysis by observing that "what is considered 'taken' is a
narrower concept in Louisiana when contrasted with federal law.
Under federal law, interpretation of the term 'taken' is broader. 5 6
This reasoning reflects the damaging category's broad sweep in
Louisiana. The State's uncompensated acquisition of the right of
ownership or its dismemberments-Avenal's description of a
taking-is infrequent because the State typically employs its eminent
domain power to achieve such drastic interventions. But impairment
of neighboring property's value by the construction or operation of a
public project, the case reports reflect, are commonplace. The
uncertain line between compensable and non-compensable losses
encourages government to avoid payment unless ordered to do so.
Avenal's use of the formula equating damagings with diminutions
in private property's value should not be extended to regulatory
takings, which also reduce property's value, absent elimination of the
prior expropriation requirement and establishment of a new
damagings category that is the functional equivalent of a partial
taking." Louisiana courts routinely analyze value-diminishing land
use legislation or regulations as regulatory takings, not as traditional
damagings.58 The State adopted the damagings language, moreover,
specifically to address the consequences of public projects, not of
public regulation. Subjecting regulatory takings to the doctrinal
confusion surrounding traditional* damagings surely should be
avoided if there is no need to do so. Finally, the equation will
transform virtually every land use dispute into a presumptive
damaging because these disputes are invariably triggered by a loss in
property values associated with the challenged land use restriction.
Avenal affords dramatic evidence, albeit in dicta, that the police
power can check private rights in the face of harsh private loss.
Writing for the majority, Justice Victory highlighted Lucas's
55. Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
56. Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 2004), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1115 (Weimer,
J., concurring).
57. For an exploration of this position, see infra notes 154-155 and
accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Pomeroy v. Town of Westlake, 357 So. 2d 1299 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1978); Layne v. City of Mandeville, 633 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993),
writ denied, 635 So. 2d 234 (La. 1994); Annison v. Hoover, 517 So. 2d 420 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So. 2d 148 (La. 1988); Standard Materials,
Inc. v. City of Slidell, 96-0684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997), 700 So. 2d 975.
59. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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insistence that even total devaluations of private property are not
constitutionally objectionable if the State's action is premised on
"background principles of nuisance and property law."6  He
announced two Louisiana background principles that would have
barred the damagings claim at the federal and state levels had A venal
been decided on the merits. One is the public trust-based doctrine
acknowledging the "right of the state to disperse fresh water.., over
saltwater marshes in order to prevent coastal erosion . .. .6 The
second is the State's police power entitlement to forestall the
imminent peril that coastal erosion poses for the State.62
"Compensation is not owed" when background principles accord the
state entitlements against private property rights, Justice Victory
asserted, "because no legally existing rights [are] being taken under
those circumstances. 63
The foregoing paragraphs assist in critiquing the fourth circuit's
rejection of Penn Central's applicability to Avenal's facts on the
ground that federal and Louisiana takings law are "different."
Differences do exist, as we have seen, growing out of the evolution
of the damagings cause of action as a unique element of state
constitutional law. But the differences cited by the fourth circuit
majority neither support its rejection of Penn Central nor cast doubt
upon the parallels between federal and Louisiana takings law
sketched out above.
The fourth circuit first asserted that the Fifth Amendment lacks
a"damagings" clause,' and second, that its remedial standard is "just
compensation" while article 1, section 4 requires compensation "to
the full extent of [the owner's] loss. '65 These differences certainly
exist, but they had no bearing at all on the court's determination that
the diversion project is a taking. Whatever might be said about the
takings/damagings dichotomy became irrelevant once the court chose
to analyze Avenal as a taking. If a federal court agreed with the fourth
circuit that the police power did not trump the oyster lessees' property
rights and that the project totally destroyed these rights, moreover, it
too would clearly have deemed the State's project a taking under
60. See Avenal, 886 So. 2d at 1107 n.28. The phrase derives from Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm 'n, 505 U.S.
1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), in which he uses the phrase "background principles
of the State's law of property and nuisance." Id. at 1029. But Justice Victory is
presenting Louisiana, not federal law, in his statements about the public trust and
imminent peril doctrines.
61. Avenal, 886 So. 2d at 1107 n.28.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Avenal v. State, 1999-0127 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000), 757 So. 2d 1, 8.
65. Id. at 11-12.
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.6 Likewise irrelevant
to the taking determination is the difference between the federal and
Louisiana compensation standards since this difference does not come
into play until after the taking analysis is completed.67
HI. DAMAGINGS ACTIONS: THE QUEST FOR COHERENCE
Louisiana's inverse condemnation jurisprudence is more orderly
than appearances suggest. A reasonable framework for understanding
damagings can be constructed from the jumble of decisions rendered
since the damaging clause's introduction in 1879. But doing so
requires clarification, if not reformulation of doctrinal elements
questioned in Parts I and IH. Reform also demands the judiciary's
more disciplined appreciation of the interface between constitutional
and conventional causes action and a more consistent and articulate
superintendence of this appreciation by the state's highest court.
Helpful as well would be a new statute extending the same support to
damagings that Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1511 affords to
takings. Avenal's greatest legacy, perhaps, will be the stimulus it
provides for the completion of these and related tasks that outstrip
Part III's modest goal of highlighting some of the issues that demand
the most immediate attention.
Even this lesser effort, however, faces a variety of impediments.
One is that Louisiana opinions typically treat takings and damagings
as twin components of the overall inverse condemnation format. s
Justice Weimer confirms as much in his observation that "in
Louisiana, taking and damage claims are treated the same for most
purposes, and it is seldom necessary to delineate between taking and
66. 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
67. Writing for the majority in the fourth circuit opinion, Judge J. McKay also
rejected Penn Central's reasoning on the basis of the holding of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Vermillion Development Corp. v. State, 7 So. 2d 167 (La. 1971),
that knowledge of an expropriation does not bar a claim for compensation in the
absence of bad faith. Avenal, 757 So. 2d at 12. Dissenting, Judge M. Walzer
correctly stated both that Louisiana decisions, including many of those cited at
supra note 29, are compatible with federal takings jurisprudence, and that
Vermillion is inapposite because it addressed the question of the claimant's
entitlement to compensation in a formal eminent domain proceeding, not the
question of whether a taking has been established in an inverse condemnation
action. Id. at 14-15
68. See, e.g, Angelle v. State, 34 So. 321, 326 (La. 1948); Reymond v. State,
255 La. 425, 446-47, 231 So. 2d 375, 383 (La. 1970); State v. Chambers Inv. Co.,
595 So. 2d 598, 602 (La. 1992); Constance v. State, 626 So. 2d 1151, 1155 (La.
1993); Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of City of New Orleans,
1998-0495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), 753 So. 2d 269, 275-76.
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damaging., 69 In consequence, an evaluation of damagings doctrine
often must reference opinions in which takings were alleged. Care is
required to insure that what was said about the inverse condemnation
action in a takings context applies with equal force to damagings.7 °
A second problem is that Louisiana decisions treading in the
ambiguous space dividing inverse condemnation from conventional
actions focus on results, not on careful scrutiny of how the results
were reached. They stress issues of damage, remedies and
prescription. They usually ignore the intrinsic character of the inverse
condemnation action itself, often even ignoring whether a dispute's
facts qualify it as an inverse condemnation or a conventional action.
Relating the reasoning of particular decisions to one another or to a
coherent, larger framework has not been a priority.7'
Interestingly enough, it did not begin this way. On the contrary,
the Louisiana Supreme Court commenced with and sustained a
brilliantly conceived damagings doctrine72 that compares favorably
with that of any other state in myjudgment. Its legacy seems to have
survived meandering lower court opinions and some anomalous
utterances of its own along the way leaving the legacy intact but
losing altitude. Louisiana damagings doctrine and inverse
condemnation law generally would improve dramatically, I believe,
if the Court reaffirmed this admirable legacy, revisiting problem areas
and filling in analytic voids highlighted in this Part.
The focus on results at the expense of articulate analysis explains
why various opinions blur conventional and constitutional principles
69. Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 2004), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1113.
70. In most instances, as Justice Weimer suggests, the issue does not arise
because the category "inverse condemnation" includes both takings and damagings,
and the judicial doctrines or comments featured in text apply to the overall category.
Illustrative is Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (La. 1948), which,
although addressed to a takings claim, explicitly references the damaging sub-
category and, on the basis of the inverse condemnation doctrine that it establishes,
overrules an earlier damagings case. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
Other decisions must be parsed more carefully. See the discussion of State v.
Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So. 2d 598 (La. 1992), supra note 40.
71. Commenting on the imbalance between conceptual coherence and result-
oriented pragmatism, Melvin Dakin and Michael Klein observe:
In Louisiana,... the courts appear to reach results on a far less theoretical
plane .... [A]s a general proposition, it is probably less useful for a
practitioner to attempt to master either a conceptual framework or its
language than to operate on the not inaccurate presumption that the
Louisiana courts operate on a more pragmatic plane. . . . Accordingly,
this chapter has been organized in an effort to reflect this working judicial
perspective rather than any abstract theory of intrinsically consistent
dogma relating to cognizable damage claims.
Melvin Dakin & Michael Klein, Eminent Domain in Louisiana 62 (1970).
72. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
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and formats. It also explains why the following paragraphs often
advert to judicial comments arising in response to Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5 624 rather than to Louisiana Constitution article 1, section
4. Result-oriented decisions link more immediately to the former
than to the latter, as confirmed by the striking number of public
works-related damages cases that are resolved by gaming various
prescription statutes, rather than by well-considered decisions on the
merits. Although admirably more thoughtful in content and dicta
than these cases, Avenal itself is of this genre.
Finally, the doctrinal issues selected for discussion date back to
the late-nineteenth century. Judicial and legislative attitudes can be
expected to shift over such lengthy periods, as can the circumstances
that account for the issues' original formulation. I have already
referenced evidence of movement away from judicial policing of the
divide between constitutional damagings and conventional actions,
a movement that has gained greater ground in the appellate courts
than in the State's highest court. Whether Avenal will encourage
further movement or, given the enormity of the stakes involved in the
dispute, will induce greater respect for the Court's own special legacy
is one of the case's great questions for the future.
A. Constitutional Damagings
A useful preamble to the discussion that follows may be my
statement of the constitutional damagings action's character, as
developed in Parts I and II of this essay. A constitutional damaging
ofprivate property rights occurs when, in pursuit ofapublicpurpose,
the state deliberately engages in a legislatively authorized project
causing damages that are either a direct and purposeful result or a
necessary consequence of the public purpose.
Depending upon how Avenal is understood, the entity must either
acquire its project property through a formal act of eminent domain,
or simply possess this power, which remains dormant because the
site's transfer occurs on some other basis. The damaging action
derives from a constitutionally self-executing provision designed to
compel entities possessing the power of eminent domain to provide
the compensation that should have been granted through prior formal
expropriation proceedings.73 Its purpose is to insure that the costs of
public projects are not improperly borne by those damaged by the
activities. The claimants' immunity to economic loss is qualified,
however, by subordination of their property rights to reasonable
exercises of the police power. At issue in every inverse
73. See, e.g., Chambers, 595 So. 2d at 602; Reymond v. State, 255 La. 425,
446-47, 231 So. 2d 375, 383 (La. 1970).
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condemnation action-taking or damaging-is the necessity of
balancing private loss as reflected in the diminution of the value of
the claimant's property against public welfare, as reflected by the
State's police power needs.
1. Article 1, Section 4 Damagings: A Distinctive Cause of
Action
The distinctive character of inverse condemnation actions
resonates through a number of Louisiana opinions, which afford the
core doctrinal position referenced immediately above. The most
prominent is Angelle v. State,74 which dealt with an alleged taking but
authoritatively addressed both takings and damagings as eminent
domain-based actions. Angelle has proven influential not only in
subsequent damaging cases, but in the interpretation of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5624.
Angelle arose from a sweet potato disinfection program
administered by the State's agriculture department to eradicate
sweet potato weevils. The plaintiffs produce was destroyed at a
railroad terminal where the state agents who conducted the spraying
negligently caused a fire. The plaintiff sought to avoid a sovereign
immunity bar to a tort action by characterizing the crop's loss as an
unconstitutional taking of his property.75
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied the claimant the option of
characterizing as a tort an event that conformed to the inverse
condemnation format, thereby erecting a firm barrier between
tortious acts and constitutional takings or damagings. Torts, the
Court stated, are "as far removed from a deliberate appropriation as
anything could be: forsooth, a wholly unintentional destruction
which served no public purpose whatever."76  The "taking or
damaging of the private property," according to the Court, must be
"intentional or occur[] as a necessary consequence of the public
undertaking. ... In such matters, the damage is on a parity with the
intentional taking or damaging under the power of eminent
domain.""
74. 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321. Angelle's application to the damagings as
well as takings inverse condemnation category is apparent not only in its express
reference to both categories, but to its explicit disagreement with dicta in DeMoss
v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1928), in which a
claimed constitutional damaging of property associated with the parish's
construction of a road was found despite the parish's negligence. Angelle, 212 La.
at 1076-77, 1086-87, 34 So. 2d at 323, 326-27.
75. Id. at 1069, 34 So. 2d at 323.
76. Id. at 1077, 34 So. 2d at 323.
77. Id. at 1085, 34 So. 2d at 326.
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The Louisiana Court relied directly on United States Supreme
Court decisions distinguishing between inverse condemnation and
tort actions as a basis for establishing jurisdiction of the United
States Claims Court, which is authorized by the federal Tucker Act
to hear the former but not the latter.78 Summarizing federal
precedents, the Angelle Court stated that "no claims are sustainable
against the United States unless there is an intentional taking of the
private property-that is, a taking for a public purpose unrelated to
a tortious destruction or damaging by an agent of the government."'7 9
This rule, Angelle pronounced, "applies with equal force to suits
against the State. ' '"°
Subsequent decisions sustain both this sharp division between
inverse condemnation and conventional actions and the former's
preemption of the latter. Illustrative is Reymond v. State."l The
Reymond plaintiff successfully invoked Civil Code article 667 in the
courts below to obtain recovery for structural damage to her house
caused by the construction of an adjacent highway. But the Louisiana
Supreme Court rejected the article's applicability because, it stated,
"the damage complained of... arose out of and in connection with
a public body's exercise of eminent domain, and the recovery... is
provided in special constitutional and statutory provisions for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain." 2
Gray v. State" is another Louisiana Supreme Court decision that
refuses to blur the boundary between constitutional and conventional
actions on the basis of misconceived analogies. When the State
expropriated land for a highway, it also acquired a temporary
servitude for a borrowing pit on adjacent private property.
Subsequently, it chose an alternative pit location and removed fill
from that location for the project. Unwittingly, it failed to comply
with norms governing rescission of the first servitude or acquisition
of the second.84
The claimants desired to recover the excavated fill's value, but
could do so only by suing in tort because the inverse condemnation
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2004).
79. Angelle, 212 La. at 1081, 34 So. 2d at 325.
80. Id. The Louisiana rule that an inverse condemnation action differs from a
tort action because the damages associated with the former must be a deliberate or
necessary consequence of governmental activities that serve a legislatively
authorized public purpose closely tracks the federal rule. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v.
United States, 264 U.S. 146, 44 S. Ct. 264 (1924); Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d
580 (9th Cir. 1963); Moden v. United States, 60 Fed. Cl. 275 (2004); Berenholz v.
United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 620 (1982).
81. 255 La. 425, 231 So. 2d 375 (La. 1970).
82. Id. at 446,231 So. 2d at 383.
83. 250 La. 1045, 202 So. 2d 24 (1967).
84. Id.
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remedy was then limited by the value of the real property's
depreciation, which in this case was considerably less than the fill's
value." They succeeded by persuading the lower court to portray
the state's action as a "trespass in legal bad faith for which the [state]
must respond in tort.",8 6
The supreme court reversed, rejecting the plaintiffs' "extravagant
demands for redress in tort" as "patently erroneous."87
[IUt makes no difference in determining the amount to be
awarded that the property was appropriated and not formally
expropriated. Albeit in appropriation cases the condemning
authority does not obey the mandate of the law that the
compensation be paid before the taking, the non-compliance
of this condition precedent to the condemnation does not
subject the appropriator to a penalty, for when the owner
recovers just compensation he recovers all the law gives
him.88
These opinions refuse to allow inverse condemnation actions to
be resolved under conventional rules or to be pursued as conventional
actions-the torts of negligence (Angelle) or strict liability (Reymond)
or of conversion and trespass (Gray). They recognize that
substituting a conventional for a constitutional action on the basis of
these analogies is to confuse superficial likeness with fundamental
difference. Private persons who commit torts, create nuisances, or
violate the immovable property rights of others do not engage in
legislatively authorized behavior, do not seek to achieve nor are
empowered to implement public purposes, do not possess or exercise
the power to compel transfer of private property rights, and most
certainly cannot invoke the sovereign police power as a basis for
sheltering their damage-producing activity. 9
2. Title 9, Section 5264: An Exclusive Companion to Article 1,
Section 4 Damagings?
A question parallel to that posed above under article 1, section 4
pertains to the coverage of Louisiana Revised Statutes, 9:5624. Does
this statute prescribe constitutional damagings actions only, or does
it cover conventional actions as well? Despite apparent authority to
85. Id. at 1056-57, 1059, 202 So. 2d at 28, 29.
86. Id. at 1060, 202 So. 2d at 29.
87. Id. at 1058, 202 So. 2d at 28.
88. Id. at 1061, 202 So. 2d at 30.
89. For a more recent decision that clearly sets forth the distinctions advanced
in text between constitutional inverse condemnation and conventional tort, see
Mathis v. City of DeRidder, 599 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992).
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the contrary,90 the statute could be construed to pertain to
constitutional damaging actions exclusively, just as Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:1511 pertains only to constitutional takings.
Supporting this construction are parallels in the wording of the
statute and article. 1, section 4; judicial application of Angelle's
"necessary consequence" requirement to actions prescribed by the
statute; and a construction of the statute's phrase "public works" that
expressly aligns the statute with the "injurious affection" category
targeted by the damagings clause. My purpose in addressing these
factors is not to quarrel with cases construing the statute's coverage
to pertain both to constitutional damagings and to conventional
causes of action. It is too late in the day for that debate. Rather, the
discussion demonstrates how easily blurred the line between the two
has become, and why it would be desirable to substitute two statutes
for this single statute, devoting one exclusively to damagings and the
other to conventional actions.
Adopted two years after Angelle and subsequently revised, the
statute provides, "When private property is damaged for public
purposes any and all actions for such damages are prescribed by the
prescription of two years, which shall begin to run after the
completion and acceptance of the public works." 9'
Article 1, section 4 states that "property shall not be... damaged
by the state... except for public purposes. "92 The statute advances
a two-year prescriptive period for "property" that is "damaged for
public purposes" by "public works", whose completion and
acceptance commence the running of the prescriptive period.93 The
parallelism of the language is undeniable: article 1, section 4 speaks
to "property" "damaged by the state" for "public purposes"; the
statute references "property" "damaged" for "public purposes." 94 If
the question of parallel meanings of the two provisions turns on their
90. See, e.g., Lyman v. Town of Sunset, 500 So. 2d 390 (La. 1987) (action for
damages to an immovable resulting from municipal landfill); Small v. Avoyelles
Parish Police Jury, 589 So. 2d 1132 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (suit for property
damage and personal injuries resulting from sewage back-up); LeBlanc v. City of
Lafayette, 558 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (suit for damages resulting from
proximity of municipal landfill); Boudreaux v. Terrebonne Parish, 422 So. 2d 1209
(La. App. 1 st Cir. 1982) (suit for damages in tort alleging trespass). Disputes in
which government acquired its site consensually rather than through eminent
domain have traditionally not been included in the constitutional damaging category
and hence were actionable on a conventional basis. See infra notes 104-107 and
accompanying text. For a listing of such cases deemed subject to coverage under
La. R.S. 9:5624, see infra note 106.
91. La. R.S. 9:5624 (1991).
92. La. Const. art. 1, § 4.
93. La. R.S. 9:5624 (1991).
94. Compare La. Const. art. 1, § 4, with La. R.S. 9:5624 (1991).
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use of parallel language, arguing as an original matter that the statute
is not exclusively linked to constitutional damagings is a challenge
indeed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion, Estate ofPatout v. City
of New Iberia,95 appears to reinforce the exclusivity of the linkage by
holding that, like the damages associated with an article 1, section 4
action, those associated with actions prescribed by the statute must be
a "necessary consequence" of the government's pursuit of a public
purpose. Patout was brought as a trespass action to recover damages
from a city that negligently dumped refuse on the claimants' lands
while operating an adjacent landfill. In a familiar scenario the suit
turned into a battle over which of three prescriptive periods governed
the action: the general delictual prescriptive period of one year found
in Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, the two-year period for
damagings under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624, or the three-year
period for takings under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:5111.96
The Court opted for the delictual prescription statute.97  It
engrafted on the two other statutes the article 1, section 4
requirement, earlier announced in Angelle, that the damage suffered
must be a "necessary consequence" of achieving the public purpose. 98
Consistent with Angelle, it held that damages resulting from the city's
negligence fail this test.99
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624's additional reference to
"public works" arguably strengthens the case that it covers only
damagings actions. The damaging clause was added to state
constitutions to compensate for public works' damages that, absent
the clause, would not have been compensable.' 0 The "public works"
language, therefore, would seem to target the "injurious affection"
format that the article 1, section 4 damaging action was designed to
compensate.
It is useful to pause at this point to consider the role that the
"necessary consequence" element could have played, and with
requisite judicial and legislative clarification, still can play as the
bedrock of a clear, principled, and coherent rationale dividing
95. 1998-0961 (La. 1999), 738 So. 2d 544.
96. Id. at 548-49. See also La. Civ. Code art. 3492; La. R.S. 9:5624, 13:5111
(1991).
97. Patout, 738 So. 2d at 555.
98. Id. at 552-53, 555.
99. Id. at 554 (La. R.S. 9:5624), 555 (La. R.S. 13:511).
100. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. An author writing within
the decade in which Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 was enacted concurs with
the position advanced in the text by his assertion that ". . . R.S. 9:5624 squarely
contemplate[s] consequential damages ... " a term he defined in a manner that




constitutional damagings from conventional actions. This is precisely
the element's role in federal law today, as it has been essentially since
the time the damagings clause was adopted in Louisiana. Angelle
explicitly borrowed the element from federal law, enshrining it in
Louisiana inverse condemnation law for precisely the same purpose.
Although written almost a half-century later, Patout brings Angelle
squarely into the present by what appears to be the brilliant tour de
force of linking through the "necessary consequence" element the
federal rule, the article 1, section 4 rule as announced in Angelle, and
the scope of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624's coverage.
Alas, Louisiana damagings law never quite achieved this take-off,
and indeed seems to have stalled on the runway of Patout itself with
the Court's footnoted declaration that "[w]e decline to address the
question of whether negligence on the part of a public entity or its
agents will always preclude the application of R.S. 9:5624 as some
lower courts have held."' '° With this statement the Court not only
cast doubt on the organic linkages to federal and article 1, section 4
law that are robustly supported by the "necessary consequence"
element, but called into question even the durability of the statute's
negligence exception. It did so without explanation or discussion, as
so often occurs at the critical points in the evolution or devolution of
Louisiana damagings law.
As matters stand today, the case reports feature a variety of
opinions extending the statute's coverage to actions to proceedings
they treat as conventional actions. Why so? The answer is not clear,
in part because, again, the issue is simply ignored in a number of the
opinions applying its coverage to these actions. 102 Their muteness
calls to mind the Dakin and Klein observation that the search for an
"abstract theory of intrinsically consistent dogma relating to
cognizable damage claims" in Louisiana doctrine is misguided
because the "Louisiana courts operate on a more pragmatic plane.""1 3
Pragmatism unfortunately is not enough. Avenal brings home, as few
cases can, the stakes in massive public and private costs and in risks
to public safety and health that need to be managed by a principled,
coherent legal structure governing constitutional damagings law. The
quest for coherence ought not to be viewed as a pursuit of theory for
theory's sake, but as a call for rational management of the recurrent
tension between community welfare and private loss.
Another possible explanation for the statute's coverage of
constitutional and conventional actions is suggested by Chaney v.
101. Patout, 738 So. 2d at 553 n.8.
102. See supra note 90.
103. Dakin & Klein, supra note 71, at 62.
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Travelers Insurance Co.,1° a Louisiana Supreme Court opinion that
appears to have denied constitutional damagings status to disputes
flunking the prior expropriation requirement.' Chaney arguably
could explain a number of prescription opinions °6 that would
otherwise seem aberrant in treating inverse condemnation disputes
as conventional actions.'07
A third possibility may well be sovereign immunity's fall from
grace in Louisiana. During an earlier era, litigants struggled- to
shoehorn their claims into the constitutional damagings box to
avoid the sovereign immunity bar. With the latter's erosion, the
courts may feel less compelled to police the line between tort and
inverse condemnation as rigorously as late-nineteenth century
judges did in McMahon v. St. Louis, Ark. & Texas R.R. Co., 10 8 or
mid-twentieth century judges, in Angelle v. State.10 9
Whatever the source of the problem, legislative clarification
would seem called for in this uncertain area. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5624 should be. amended to serve'the same purposes in
relation to constitutional damagings that title 13, section 1511
serves for constitutional takings. If the prior condemnation
requirement remains vital in the post-Avenal era, the requirement
should be specifically incorporated into the amended statute so that
the only "public works" covered by it are those conducted on
premises formally expropriated by the State.
Conventional actions against the State that are currently covered
by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 should receive coverage
under a newly drafted prescription statute, 110 or be remitted for
104. 259 La. 1,249 So. 2d 181 (La. 1971).
105. This requirement is discussed in the text accompanying supra notes 10-14.
106. See, e.g., Florsheim v. State, 201 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967)
(damage to claimant's buildings and parking lot caused by highway construction;
claimant sold land for highway right of way and granted state a servitude for
construction purposes); Wilson v. City of Baton Rouge, 683 So. 2d 382 (La. App.
I st Cir. 1997) (erosion of claimant's land by municipal canal project; claimant's
predecessor in title sold canal right of way to city); Oswalt v. Irby Constr. Co., 424
So. 2d 348 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982) (destruction of claimant's irrigation levees by
construction of pipeline; pipeline right of way granted by claimant).
107. An earlier appellate court opinion, Miller v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 173 So.
2d 840 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), contests this position. The court probed whether
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 pertained to a dispute in which a pipeline
company obtained its right of way by grant. The court replied in the affirmative,
stating that "[p]rivate property may be damaged for public purposes in the course
of work done under a conventional agreement as well as work done pursuant to an
expropriation or appropriation. The crucial test is whether it was for a public
purpose." Id. at 844.
108. 41 La. Ann. 827, 6 So. 640 (La. 1889).
109. 212 La. 1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (La. 1948).
110. At least two drafting issues attend the second statute. The first concerns the
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coverage under one of the existing prescription statutes for
conventional actions.
B. Chaney v. Travelers Insurance Company: Must Government
Expropriate Its Own Site?
Earlier discussion details the nineteenth-century origin of the prior
expropriation requirement as a component of injurious affection
actions." The requirement's survival into the second half of the
twentieth century was apparently confirmed in the Louisiana Supreme
Court's 1971 decision, Chaney v. Travelers Insurance Company.
112
In Chaney, a municipal contractor utilized the city's existing right of
way to enlarge a canal. Vibrations from heavy equipment employed
to install two large pipes damaged the plaintiffs adjacent dwelling.
The Court found the city liable under Louisiana Civil Code article
667 rather than under article 1, section 4.113
The Court emphasized that the city already possessed the right of
way on which its contractor worked, rather than expropriated it as an
integral component of the canal improvement project. The project,
the Court states, was not "the direct result of expropriation
proceedings.., nor was the damage... incidental to an expropriation
proceeding .... 114 Quoting the damagings clause, it then advanced
the expected observation that "since [the damage] has not been
compensated as the Constitution directs, [it] must be recovered by
resort to other principles of our law allowing recovery in such
length of the statute's prescriptive period. La. R.S. 9:5624's two-year period is not
subject to extension by the continuing tort doctrine. See Nuckolls v. State, 337 So.
2d 313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976). That doctrine is applicable to Louisiana Civil
Code article 3492, the one-year prescription statute for general delictual actions,
however. The second concerns identification of the types of public actions that
merit status as conventional actions. If the prior expropriation requirement survives
Avenal, one action to be covered will be that arising from disputes in which
government does not obtain its site through formal condemnation. But identifying
other types of conventional actions is more problematic. The Legislature should
give a great deal more attention than was possible in an essay of this limited scope
to a systematic inventory and classification of all actions-excluding constitutional
damagings actions-arising in consequence ofpublic works that merit treatment as
conventional actions. If there are too few to merit their coverage other than in
existing prescription statutes, there may be no need for a second statute. Otherwise,
the Legislature should draft its listing in a manner designed insofar as possible to
avoid confusion with the constitutional damagings actions covered by amended La.
R.S. 9:5624.
111. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
112. 259 La. 1, 249 So. 2d 181 (1971).
113. Id at 16-17, 249 So. 2dat 186.
114. Id. at 9, 249 So. 2d at 184.
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instances."' 5  Rather than selecting the inverse condemnation
damaging proceeding as the appropriate vehicle, however, it treated
the matter as a delictual proceeding under Civil Code article 667.'16
It offered no explanation for its choice beyond what might be gleaned
from its earlier reference to the absence of an expropriation
proceeding.
If the Court's assertion that the damage was "not compensated as
the Constitution directs" means simply that the city failed to
expropriate the claimant's property, why isn't the usual inverse
condemnation action a clear principle of law "allowing recovery in
such instances"?' 17 Again, the answer is not clear. It may perhaps lie
in the Court's evident concern about the city's acquisition of its
project site consensually rather than through eminent domain.
If so, its position is vulnerable to severe criticism, particularly
following Avenal. The focus of the constitutional damagings action
is the injury suffered by the private party on its site. Justice Victory's
opinion for the Avenal Court illustrates the point perfectly by, on the
one hand, ignoring how the diversion project site was obtained while,
on the other, devoting its full attention to the precise nature of the
oyster lessees' injury.
Likewise opposing Chaney's apparent reasoning is the response
that liability should not turn on government's exercise of its eminent
domain power, but on its capacity to employ that power should the
need arise. 18 Take Chaney as an example. If the City had not already
possessed a right of way for use by its contractor, it most certainly
could have obtained it through expropriation. The fact that it did not
have to do so would seem a slender basis for proceeding under article
667 rather than under article 1, section 4.
Avenal's apparent exclusion of the prior expropriation element
warrants unbundling the constitutional damaging action from its
115. Id.
116. Id. at 16-17, 249 So. 2d at 186.
117. This was the Louisiana Supreme Court's choice sixteen years earlier in
Buras ce Factory v. Department offHighways, 235 La. 158, 103 So. 2d 74 (1958),
in which the Court evaluated under the inverse condemnation damagings format a
scenario in which the State acquired its property interest by grant, rather than by
expropriation. See infra notes 127-132.
118. The argument, as phrased by one commentator, proceeds as follows:
[I]t should not.., be... necessary... that there be an actual exercise of
the power of eminent domain. It is the possession of the power of eminent
domain that has placed the taker-actor in a position to injure the
landowner. Thus even though there is no exercise of that power either on
the injured landowner or the adjacent landowners, recovery should lie if
market value is depreciated by the construction or operation of the
improvement concerned.
Hebert, supra note 36, at 503 n.65.
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original source in government's expropriation of the offending site.
But-and this is a huge but-unbundling will birth a novel inverse
condemnation damagings action for Louisiana. Discussion of this
dramatic possibility is reserved for the article's conclusion.
C. Resolving Constitutional Damagings Disputes by Conventional
Principles
Courts flout Angelle's signature treatment of inverse
condemnation actions as distinct from conventional actions when they
resolve the former by conventional rather than constitutional
principles. Flouting may take the form either of ignoring that the case
presents an inverse condemnation claim, or of by acknowledging the
character of the claim but resolving it on the basis of conventional
principles. The following discussion tracks these two patterns.
1. Treating Damagings Actions as Conventional Actions
Opinions least respectful of the Angelle paradigm are those that,
without explanation, flatly ignore the damagings clause by converting
damagings actions into conventional actions. Illustrative of this
conversion are Nuckolls v. Louisiana State Highway Department119
and Eubanks v. Bayou D 'Arbonne Lake Watershed District.2 ' In
Nuckolls, a state highway project flooded the claimant's adjoining
land, a classic instance of the constitutional damaging format. The
suit was brought, however, as a conventional action for "unauthorized
alteration of the natural drain of rain waters causing the overflow onto
[the plaintiff's] property.' 121 It failed, but not on the Angelle principle
that an inverse condemnation action affords the exclusive route for
the dispute. Rather, the Court ruled that the suit was prescribed under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624.122
In Eubanks, subdivision homeowners premised an action for
damages on a "failure to warn theory' 123 against a water district under
a similarly classic inverse condemnation scenario--flooding of
private property by a public project that dammed a bayou and directed
overflows though a spillway in the vicinity of the claimants' homes.
As in Nuckolls, the court invoked the prescription statute to deny
liability while ignoring the underlying constitutional damaging
119. 337 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
120. 32,334 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999), 742 So. 2d 113.
121. Nuckolls, 337 So. 2d at 314.
122. Id. at315.
123. Eubanks, 742 So. 2d at 117.
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issue."' No explanation for electing not to present and resolve thedispute as an inverse condemnation action was offered.
2. Resolving Damaging Actions Under Conventional
Principles
This essay's Introduction identified two questions that arise when
courts make reference to conventional principles, such as Louisiana
Civil Code article 667, in resolving disputes they concede to be
inverse condemnation damaging actions.'25 The first is whether
government will not be liable if a private party behaving similarly
would not be liable. The second question is whether the government
will be liable if the private party would be liable.
The answer to the first question is clearly yes. The answer to the
second is not clear. A number of cases suggest the answer is also
yes. 126 But these are cases in which the issue of the State's liability
on constitutional grounds is not in issue. Suppose that issue was
raised, and the state was exonerated on a constitutional ground.
Would the state nevertheless remain liable on conventional grounds?
a. Buras, Chambers, and Constance: Reasoning by Analogy or
by Sound Constitutional Analysis?
Buras Ice Factory v. Department of Highways, '27 Department of
Transportation v. Chambers Investment Co.,' 8 and Constance v.
State'"9 address the impact of Louisiana Civil Code article 667 on
inverse condemnation claims, and all determine that the challenged
action or project would not have violated the claimant's article 667
rights if engaged in by a private actor rather than by the state. These
opinions leave no doubt that the state will not be liable in an inverse
condemnation action if a private individual will not be liable under
article 667. With the possible exception of Constance, however,
they do not tell us why.
Nor does their reasoning definitively answer the question whether
the State will be liable if the private party would have been liable
124. Id. at 118. If either Avenal or Chambers, both of which ignore the prior
expropriation element, more accurately state Louisiana damagings law than Chaney,
the cases cited at supra note 106 also need to be added to the category of decisions
that convert constitutional damagings actions into conventional actions.
125. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of City of New
Orleans, 1998-0495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), 753 So. 2d 269, 275, 278, 281-82;
Kendall v. State, 168 So. 2d 840, 842-44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
127. 235 La. 158, 103 So. 2d 74 (La. 1958).
128. 595 So. 2d 598 (La. 1992).
129. 626 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1993).
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under that article. Other cases answer this question affirmatively. 30
But they do not tell us how this liability, which is either premised on
an analogy to or is a direct application of conventional principles,
would fare against a determination in the same case that a police
power defense exonerated the State of constitutional liability.
In Buras, a landowner who sold ice to professional fishermen
from his ice factory located at the end of a canal brought an article 1,
section 4 damaging action against the State."' Having been granted
a right of way by the canal's owner, the State built a roadway across
the canal that severely diminished the value of the claimant's property
by blocking the fishermen's access to the factory. Ruling against the
claimant, the Court stated that the constitutional damaging provision
"applies only in cases.., where the public improvement ... would
give rise to an action for damages under Articles 2315 or 667 of the
Civil Code had it been done by an individual or private
corporation." 32
Does the Court's use of the term "applies" signify that the Civil
Code articles govern the inverse condemnation action's outcome, and
that liability under article 667 by itself warrants liability under Article
1, Section 4? Or does it mean something very different and entirely
respectful of the portrayal of the inverse condemnation action in
Angelle, Reymond, and Gray: namely, that establishing that a private
actor would be liable under the articles suffices only to confirm that
the injured claimant possesses a constitutionally cognizable property
right against another private party, while leaving to a succeeding
inquiry whether this right will overcome or be subordinated to the
State's police power exercise or to other original elements of the
inverse condemnation action. Buras never asks this question, and,
therefore, does not answer it.
A similar scenario is repeated in Chambers, an opinion which
makes clear that, absent a property right, the claimant lacks one of the
three essentials necessary to prevail in an inverse condemnation
action.'33 The other two are that the claimant suffer damage in a
constitutional sense and that the State project serve a public
purpose.'34 At issue in Chambers was whether the claimant suffered
an article 1, section 4 damaging because construction of a highway on
land expropriated from the middle of the claimant's tract occasioned
financial loss associated with a multi-year delay in the claimant's
development and marketing of a real estate development on its
retained land. An owner's right to develop his property and the
130. See supra note 126 and cited cases.
131. Buras, 235 La. 158, 103 So. 2d 74.
132. Id. at 179, 103 So. 2d at 82.
133. State v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So. 2d 598, 603 (La. 1992).
134. Id.
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State's provision of roadway infrastructure satisfied the property
interest and public purpose requirements, respectively.'35
Turning to the "damaging in a constitutional sense" element,
Justice Dennis, the opinion's author, stated that
in order to decide whether the State caused any damage to the
claimant's right of ownership, we must determine whether the
State's construction activities resulted in inconveniences that
must be tolerated by the claimant under Article 668 or, rather,
resulted in more serious inconveniences or interference that
may be suppressed under Article 667.136
He added that "as long as the activities on the State's land do not
exceed the level of causing the claimant 'some inconvenience,' there
can be no taking or damaging of the claimant's property right."
' 13 7
These statements likewise do not reach the issues left open in Buras.
Constance entailed a damagings claim premised on a partial
blockage of access to the claimant's commercial property. Chief
Justice Calogero's majority opinion combines elements of Reymond
and Chambers in ruling against the damagings claim. The claimant
failed to satisfy either Reymond's requirement that there be special
damage peculiar to the property,'38 or Civil Code article 667's
standard that, to overcome qualifications established in Civil Code
article 668, it suffer some type of excessive or abusive conduct.'39
But this majority opinion and Justice Dennis's concurrence come
much closer to resolving the questions posed above than the two
previous decisions. The Constance opinions strongly suggest, first,
that the police power supervenes conventional liability, and, second,
that a finding of article 667 liability does not establish inverse
condemnation liability but either is irrelevant to or is merely a
preliminary component of that inquiry as it has been shaped by
Angelle, Reymond, and Gray.
Chief Justice Calogero, for example, opened his analysis with an
explicit nod to article 1, section 4's subordination of private property
rights to "reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise
of the police power.' 140 Only some lines after this statement does he
add that "a landowner's right of ownership is also limited by Civil
Code articles 667 and 668.,1' Finally, he endorsed the primacy of
the police power in the context of the traffic diversion context posed
135. Id. at 603-05.
136. Id. at 604.
137. Id. at 605.
138. Constance v. State, 626 So. 2d 1151, 1156-57 (La. 1993).
139. Id. at 1157.
140. Id. at 1155.
141. Id. (emphasis added).
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by Constance: "it has long been recognized that a public body has
the right, under itspolice power, to divert traffic without subjecting
itself to liability."1
Justice Dennis went even further in passages that appear to clarify
the questions left open in his Chambers opinion. Recurring to
Chambers's three-pronged analysis, he confirmed that the property
interest element was satisfied by the claimant's entitlement to access
to his adjacent parcel.'43 But he found it unnecessary to consider the
public purpose element because, he reasoned, the claimant failed to
establish the third element--damaging in a constitutional sense. He
tested the third element by balancing the impact of the state action on
the claimant's conceded property right against the state's police
power interest in providing for public transportation needs. His
conclusion: "there was no taking or damage in the constitutional
sense because, considering both the physical and temporal extent of
the interference, the loss suffered was not substantial."'" Lest there
be any doubt that he was not engaged in a veiled article 667 inquiry,
he stated that his police power analysis rendered "irrelevant" the
question "whether the state made work on its estate causing
actionable inconvenience to the claimants under Civil Code articles
667-669."' 45
It would be inaccurate to conclude that the foregoing views are
uniformly reflected in Louisiana constitutional damagings law,
particularly at the appellate or trial level. No other opinions
aspire-and certainly none achieve-the level of conceptual
coherence and clarity reflected in the reasoning of Justices Calogero
and Dennis. On the contrary, numerous decisions inject article 667
and other conventional doctrines into constitutional damagings
actions to resolve damagings dispute. Strikingly illustrative is an
appellate decision, Kendall v. State Department of Highways,t46
which sustained ajudgment holding the State liable for silting up the
claimant's lake by the construction of a nearby highway. Confirming
that it "is in agreement with the trial judge's conclusion," 47 the Court
quoted the following excerpt from that judge's "Reasons for
Judgment":
[T]he plaintiff is entitled to recover for that damage,
regardless of whether we place her demand upon the basis of
Article 667 of the LSA-Civil Code or upon the requirement
142. Id. at 1156.
143. Id. at 1160.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 168 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
147. Id. at 843.
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of the Constitution that the State pay damages to those whose
property it has damaged in carrying on its public work.
We say that it makes no difference which of the two legal
provisions we follow as a basis for liability as to the State.'48
Those who may still question why.this essay supports Angelle's
strict separation of constitutional damagings from conventional
actions are invited to resolve Avenal on the merits using Kendall's "it
makes no difference" position as their compass. They will quickly
find themselves enmeshed in the questions stressed throughout this
essay, and will conclude, I suspect, that the root problem lies in
framing the inquiry as if the linebetween the two kinds of actions can
be .crossed with impunity.
Most of these issues remain dormant in cases where the State
would clearly be liable when-not because-a private party would be
or when the State clearly would not be liable when-not because-a
private party would not be. The ultimate test of the line-crossing
applauded in Kendall occurs when a private party would clearly be
liable had it performed the State's act, but the police power shelters
that same act from imputing liability to government.
Can there be any doubt that the State would not be liable, absent
some unusual but not unheard-of arrangement in which a special
legislative act linked to unique activity provides non-constitutional
monetary relief?'49 If this conclusion is correct, the fundamental basis
for this essay's conceptual model of the damagings action-which
itself merely restates what is explicit or implied in the Angelle line of
authority-becomes both clear and, I believe, compelling.
This model spurns invoking analogies drawn from conventional
actions to decide constitutional damagings disputes. These analogies
are not only the principal source of Louisiana's disjointed inverse
condemnation doctrine, but advance neither logic nor policy. A
misconception is compounded with a non-sequitur in the positions,
first, that a damagings action will not lie against government for acts
that would not render private actors liable, and, second, that
government will be liable, therefore, for acts that render the latter
148. Id. at 842-43.
149. DeMoss v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700 (1928)
illustrates such an arrangement. The claimant's land was damaged through a police
jury's negligent road-building activities. The Court granted him compensation on
the basis both of the constitutional damaging clause and a special statute requiring
that police juries engaged in road building "assess such damages as any person may
sustain." Id. at 88, 118 So. at 702. The portion of the opinion sustaining
compensation on constitutional grounds was overruled in Angelle v. State, 212 La.
1069, 34 So. 2d 321 (La. 1948), because negligent damage is not a "necessary
consequence" of the public work, but the statutory damage award received the
Court's full approval. Id.
1048 [Vol. 65
JOHN J. COSTONIS
liable, and its liability will be determined by the same rules that apply
to private activity.
The first position slides easily into the misconception that
government is not liable for the same reason that a private actor is not
liable. In fact, government is not liable for a non-conventional
constitutional reason: namely, that the claimant's lack of a cause of
action against another private party establishes that its claim fails the
"property interest" requirement of Justice Dennis's three-pronged
Chambers test. The second position simply does not follow from the
first in those instances, as Justices Victory and Weimer describe in
Avenal, when rights of private parties against other private parties
may turn out to bepublic rights in contests against the State, or, what
functionally produces the same result, when those private rights are
overridden by such imperative public welfare concerns as avoiding
impending perils or catastrophes.
Justice Victory's dicta in Avenal leave no doubt of his take both
on the public/private rights contest and on the police power's scope
in the face of imminent community peril. He confidently asserts that
the State possesses the right under the public trust doctrine to disperse
fresh water over salt marshes. 5 ° Whatever the oyster lessees' "right"
may be as against other private actors, they confuse who as between
themselves and the State enjoys the property entitlement when they
claim that they have the "right" to be free of such diversions. Nor
does he hesitate to elevate the State's interest in protecting its coastal
wetlands from imminent loss above the private property rights that
this protection clearly destroys.'
Gauging the State's liability with a private yardstick leads to other
anomalies. The State engages in all manner of activities that private
parties cannot duplicate-multi-parish coastal restoration projects
among them. How can a yardstick designed for private liability be
sensibly applied in these instances, a prime example of which is
Avenal itself? The goal that shapes the inverse condemnation action,
moreover, is properly allocating public projects' costs by balancing
general welfare (police power) needs against the diminution of private
property's value. But this calculus is inapposite in conventional
actions which are shaped to serve different and much narrower ends.
The tort paradigm's duty/risk analysis, for example, is simply not
conceived to manage the tension between community welfare and
private entitlements. 5 2 Nor was that paradigm constructed to address
150. Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 2004), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1108 n.28.
151. Id.
152. Duty/risk analysis is useful for cautionary purposes, but leads to a dead end
when damage is a necessary consequence of an urgent public project and no
reasonable measures are available to government to avoid the damage. The analysis
is useful in directing government to evaluate the foreseeability of damage and to
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activities that, in tandem, are legally authorized, serve valuable,
legislatively declared community purposes, and cause injury that is a
necessary consequence of their public utility.'53
IV. CONCLUSION
If the preceding portrayal of Avenal's many facets is sound,
Avenal may be that rare case in which avoidance of a decision on the
merits actually changes the law more profoundly than if the dispute
had been addressed head on. In fact, Avenal appear to have birthed
a novel inverse condemnation action under Article 1, Section 4.
The traditional "injurious affection" action, which requires
government's prior condemnation of its site by government, will
continue unchanged. But Avenal appears to exemplify a
constitutional damagings action for Louisiana in which prior
condemnation by the State plays no role. Conceptually, this novel
action in Louisiana is a variant of the familiar partial takings action
explore alternative modes ofprosecuting the project so that damage can be avoided.
But the Avenal diversion project's damage is completely foreseeable as a necessary
consequence of the public purpose being pursued, and reasonable alternatives are
not available. Louisiana's coastline cannot be restored absent the diversion of the
Mississippi River's waters through the salt marshes, and this diversion necessarily
modifies the salinity of the waters over the leased oyster water bottoms. Surely the
conclusion cannot be a categorical assertion that the government has no duty to
those uniquely burdened by the project because such alternatives do not exist.
Equally certain, it cannot be that the government is therefore liable for any and all
damage for which its foreseeably harmful project is the proximate cause. Analysis
of such conflicts-the resolution of which turns on fairness in allocating the costs
of public projects and not on risk foreseeability and harm avoidance-must be
elevated to the constitutional plane and its associated police power/private rights
analysis.
153. The question can also be posed whether the same set of facts may be made
actionable under both a constitutional damaging and a conventional action format.
See, e.g., Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of City of New Orleans,
1998-0495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), 753 So. 2d 269 (claimant entitled to proceed
with both causes of action and to claim both inverse condemnation and general tort
damages); Ursin v. New Orleans Aviation Bd., 506 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 5th Cir.),
rev'don other grounds, 515 So. 2d 1087 (La. 1987) (same). The question raises
a variety of procedural and remedial issues that exceed this essay's scope.
However, the essay's analysis of the subordination of private rights to the police
power requires the conclusion that the conventional action must fail if the
constitutional damagings action fails. See supra notes 17, 60-63, & 140-45 and
accompanying text. A similar question may also be posed under Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5624: does the statute apply only to the inverse condemnation remedy
or to both that remedy and to a general damages remedy? Acadian Heritage Realty,
Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 434 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), and LeBlanc v.
City of Lafayette, 558 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990), elect the former, while




in federal constitutional law. Its sole inquiry will be that posed in the
latter action: whether or not diminution in value has occurred under
circumstances in which fairness or overriding considerations of public
policy dictate that the property owner be compensated for its loss.'54
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated A venal's dispute
on precisely this basis.155 By disdaining the prior condemnation
requirement, the Louisiana Supreme Court appears, in essence, to
have adopted this model. But the Court stopped short of applying it,
employing Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 instead to prescribe the
action.
It is possible to take the analysis a step further if Avenal's facts
are viewed as presenting a non-trespassory or "non-physical
touching" scenario. This view would seem justified by Justice
Victory's limitation of the oyster lessees' property interest to the
exclusive possession of the leased water bottoms, assigning to the
State ownership and control of the waters over those bottoms
including management of the waters' salinity. 156 Under this view, the
scenario is functionally identical to that in which private property is
depreciated by the noise pollution of nearby aircraft or the
offensiveness of a nearby sanitary landfill or "dump," as landfills
used to be called in less euphemistic days. The Louisiana Supreme
Court decisions confirm that non-trespassory damagings are indeed
actionable provided that the damages sustained are special to the
property of the individual plaintiff or class of plaintiffs rather than
scattered throughout the community generally.157
Modeled as a non-trespassory case, Avenal presents itself as an
action that Professor William Stoebuck has labeled "condemnation
by nuisance."' 58 He derived this phrase from his analysis of a variety
of federal and state cases'59 in which government was deemed liable
154. It is assumed, of course, that the public project does not totally deprive the
private property of any value. If it did, it would constitute a taking under both
federal and Louisiana constitutional law. See supra notes 21 (U.S. Const. amend.
5) & 31 (La. Const. art. 1, § 4) and accompanying text. Hence, my description of
the novel action as a partial taking only.
155. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
156. Avenal v. State, 2003-3521 (La. 2004), 886 So. 2d 1085, 1106.
157. See supra note 47 and cited cases. "Special damages" may be suffered by
a class of persons as well as by a single individual. See Ursin v. New Orleans
Aviation Bd., 506 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 5th Cir.), rev'don other grounds, 515 So.
2d 1087 (La. 1987) (inverse condemnation action brought by property owners
living in proximity to airport). Cf Acadian Heritage Realty, Inc. v. City of
Lafayette, 434 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (nuisance action brought by
owners of property in proximity to landfill).
158. William B. Stoebuck, Non Trespassory Takings in Eminent Domain 158
(1977).
159. Among the principal cases cited are Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,
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for the diminution of private property's value by public landfills,
airports, and other uses that, while socially beneficial, devalue private
property. His conclusion: an "activity by an entity having the power
of eminent domain, which activity would constitute a nuisance
according to the law of torts, is a taking of property for public use,
even though such activity may be authorized by legislation."'
60
There is considerable merit in classifying Avenal as a partial
taking that should be further sub-classified as a condemnation by
nuisance. Certainly, every element of the Stoebuck formulation 6 1 is
satisfied by my earlier formulation that a constitutional damaging of
private property rights occurs when, in pursuit of-a public purpose,
the State deliberately engages in a legislatively authorized project
causing damages that are either a direct and purposeful result or a
necessary consequence of the public purpose. 6' His observation that
government need only possess, not exercise, the power of eminent
domain squares, of course, with the new Louisiana inverse
condemnation action. Damage to the oyster leases is undeniable,
moreover, and is no less "special" than that suffered by groups of
persons located in proximity to airports or landfills, formats that have
given rise to special damages in prior Louisiana litigation. 1
63
Condemnation by nuisance also describes the framework giving
rise to non-trespassory takings more fittingly than the classical
damagings paradigm does. It features permanent acquisition of the
government's site and permanent location there of a land use that
depreciates proximate private property by the use's inherent
offensiveness. Classical damagings may reflect these features, of
course. But their offense more often results from offsite damage
233 U.S. 546,34 S. Ct. 654 (1946) (railroad tunnel); Thornburg v. City of Portland,
376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962) (airport); Aliverti v. City of Walla Walla, 298 P. 698
(Wash. 1931) (sewage disposal plant).
160. Stoebuck, supra note 158, at 158.
161. Professor Stoebuck uses the term "taking" in his formulation. But his
discussion recognizes that condemnation by nuisance also comprehends damagings
as it properly should since the difference between the two is one of often
imperceptible degree and, indeed, because the actual injury in this category is more
likely to be a damaging than a taking. See id. at 159, 162.
162. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that the damage associated
with a landfill may be a "necessary consequence" of a public work pursued for a
public purpose under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624. Lyman v. Town of
Sunset, 500 So. 2d 390, 393 (La. 1987). Strikingly, the "necessary consequence"
language derives directly fromAngelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 1086, 34 So. 2d 321,
326 (La. 1948), which viewed that element as the sine qua non of a constitutional
damagings action. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. For the view
that actions prescribable under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 should be limited
exclusively to constitutional damagings actions, see supra notes 90-100 and
accompanying text.
163. See supra note 157 and cited cases.
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associated with the public work's construction--cracked foundations,
flooded lands, sewer back-ups, and the like. The property interest
obtained by government, moreover,, is often transitory, serving as a
platform from which government work is carried out. Classical
damagings tend, therefore, to focus more intensely on the acts of
government or its contractors than on the installation of permanent
land uses that are inherently offensive to nearby properties. Avenal,
of course, fits neatly within the latter category.
Finally, classifying non-trespassory damagings in the manner
suggested brings into the play what truly is at stake when a socially
desirable land use necessarily damages private property rights: the
need to balance the State's police power entitlements against private
loss. As the body of this essay insists, constitutionalization of the
inverse condemnation action rests ultimately upon the police power
element, which has no place in a conventional action. Duty/risk tort
analysis, which assumes that the jural relations obtaining between
private parties apply as well to government, was not designed to
duplicate the police power/private rights analysis.1"4 Unsurprisingly,
it played no role whatsoever in the constitutional analyses advanced
in dicta by Justices Victory and Weimer in Avenal.
Endorsement of the condemnation by nuisance action might raise
fears of unbounded public liability and of basing a constitutional
damagings action on conventional nuisance law. But the fears are not
credible. Government is going to be sued one way or the other. 6 '
The proper question is which format---condemnation by nuisance or
conventional nuisance-is likely to produce the fairer and more well
reasoned result? The .argument has already been advanced that an
action whose fulcrum is police power/private loss balancing is clearly
more apt than one relying on duty/risk analysis. 66 The second
objection, it should be obvious by now, collapses with the
understanding that despite the similarities in the factual formats, a
constitutional nuisance is qualitatively different than a conventional
nuisance because it measures thejural relations between the state and
a private party by a police power/private loss yardstick that is no part
of a conventional action.
Whether Louisiana's new constitutional damaging action is
described as a partial taking or condemnation by nuisance is less
important, ultimately, than the impetus its evolution affords for a
164. See supra note 152.
165. See, e.g., Lyman, 500 So. 2d at 393 (landfill); Acadian Heritage Realty v.
City of Lafayette, 434 So. 2d 182 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1983) (landfill); Ursin v. New
Orleans Aviation Bd., 506 So. 2d 947 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987), rev'don other
grounds, 515 So. 2d 1087 (La. 1987) (airport); LeBlanc v. City of Lafayette, 558
So. 2d 259 (La. App. 3dCir. 1990) (landfill).
166. See supra note 152.
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fresh look at the various constitutional and statutory questions posed
in this essay. I believe that Louisiana's inverse condemnation
doctrine proceeds from a solid conceptual base, as exemplified in
Angelle and Reymond, overall, and in Patout's engrafting ofAngelle's
"necessary consequence" requirement onto Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5624. Angelle clarifies that this base aligns with federal
law, which insists upon a firm boundary between inverse
condemnation actions and conventional actions.
In my judgment, Louisiana's best option-and it is a very good
one indeed-is to reaffirm in contemporary guise this model, which
clarifies why the two types of actions must be sharply distinguished.
Alternatives leading down other roads will not lead to a better place
than the refurbished Angelle option promises.
Reaffirmation of Angelle will demand greater consistency and
coherence in the resolution of individual disputes. The Louisiana
Supreme Court's leadership is essential. As a law giver, it deserves
high praise for adopting a model that is better conceived and more
durable than those applied elsewhere. As a teacher, it is positioned
to define Angelle's conceptual structure even more powerfully than
in the past. It can illuminate the organic linkage of the federal inverse
condemnation/tort divide, of Louisiana's adoption of the this model
in Angelle, and of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624, to which
Angelle's "necessary consequence" requirement applies with equal
force.
It can elevate Avenal over Chaney by confirming the demise of
the prior expropriation requirement. It can make Patout whole by
confirming that Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 does not cover
negligence actions, but is linked exclusively to article 1, section 4.167
It can cut damagings doctrine free of Buras's albatross that
government will be liable only when a private party acting similarly
will be liable by confirming that the jural relations between the State
and a private actor in a matter of constitutional import are not
governed by the same principles that obtain between private parties
in a civil dispute. It can carry forward the fine work already
commenced in Constance by stating unequivocally that constitutional
inverse condemnation outcomes preempt a conventional action
addressing the same matter. Likewise, while conventional results
under similar facts may be a useful backdrop for a constitutional
damagings determination, the latter must always square with the
State's police power entitlements which, if sufficiently compelling in
a given case, will override what otherwise would be an entitlement
based upon a private right.
167. Perhaps the Legislature will have amended the statute in both respects so
that the court will merely be affirming the character of the amendment.
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I believe that the Legislature's involvement is imperative as
well. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 seems to have taken on a
life of its own. Not only is it now broadly applied to constitutional
and conventional applications alike, but it occupies a very
ambiguous space alongside Louisiana Constitution article 1, section
4, Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1511, and a host of other
prescriptive statutes including Louisiana Civil Code article 1394.
In fact, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5624 is merely a
prescriptive statute. It does not create causes of action, but merely
states the prescriptive period for causes of action created elsewhere
as exemplified by the damagings action itself which is created by
article 1, section 4. Yet there is a sense that the statute in a process
that is both mute and unanalyzed is almost viewed as being itself
the source of a generic cause of actions for damages resulting from
public works activities. 1
68
The easiest way to restrict the statute to damagings actions and
to negate the possible interpretation offered immediately above is
for the Legislature to amend the statute as proposed in Part IV.169
The statute would then play the same role for constitutional
damagings actions that Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:511 plays for
constitutional takings actions. It would address not only
prescription, therefore, but also other elements such as the general
character of the cause of action, identity of the members of the class
of defendants, and availability of attorneys fees for those suing
under it.
168. Indeed, one court has held that the statute "creates a cause of action for
damages caused by public works ... ." Elmer v. West Jefferson Levee Dist., 01-
248 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2001), 803 So. 2d 229, 237, writ denied, 2002-1032 (La.
2002), 817 So. 2d 1158. Were the court correct, the statute would provide an
independent basis for all actions premised on damages to private property caused
by public works, which, in truth, describes how many lower courts in fact employ
it. This interpretation, however, is surely incorrect both as a matter of text and of
policy. The statute clearly assumes that the causes of action that it prescribes derive
from their own independent sources, familiar examples being constitutional
damagings actions deriving from article 1, section 4 or delictual actions deriving
from pertinent sections of the Louisiana Civil Code. There simply is no
specification within the statute that permits an intelligent determination of the
nature, elements, or defenses associated with this supposed independent and generic
cause of action. Worse still, the statute would render article 1, section 4 and its
police power defense irrelevant in disputes such as Avenal. The Legislature may
choose to provide compensation in the form of damages even for events that do not
rise to constitutional takings or damagings. See supra note 149. Accordingly, a
claimant could ignore article 1, section 4 and avoid its police power defense simply
by suing under the statute alone. Is it reasonable to assume that the Louisiana
Supreme Court would-or should-countenance this outcome in Avenal?
169. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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How the Legislature chooses to deal with non-constitutional
actions deriving from public works construction or operation is less
easily stated. If the Legislature amends the existing statute so that
it applies exclusively to constitutional damagings actions, it may
conclude that it has thereby exhausted the class of actions that can
arise in consequence of government's construction or operation of
a public project for a public purpose.7 0  More extensive
investigation than is possible here, on the other hand, may disclose
a variety of categories of actions that merit treatment as
conventional proceedings despite the public character of the work
or operations being pursued. If so, the Legislature will want to
consider whether these actions are adequately covered by existing
prescription statutes or whether a new prescription statute with the
former statute's categorical two-year term would be more desirable.
The Legislature should also attend. to a topic addressed only in
footnote in this essay: namely, whether, on the basis of the same set
of facts, litigants may simultaneously pursue separate causes of
action and separate remedies under the constitutional damaging and
conventional headings. 7 ' Although parallel causes of action would
seem to violate the letter, if not the spirit of, the Angelle-Reymond-
Gray line of authority, the question of their permissibility raises a
variety of complex procedural .and remedial issues that far exceed
this essay's scope. Whatever posture the Legislature chooses to
adopt on the issue, however, two positions stressed throughout the
essay should be honored. First, if parallel actions are permitted,
special care must be taken by the draftspersons to avoid allowing
litigants-or judges-to entangle constitutional and conventional
principles in the disposition of the actions."' Second, resolution
of the constitutional damaging action in favor of government will
serve as a death sentence for the conventional action claim. To
invoke our continuing Avenal hypothet for a final time, violation of
this requirement would present the perverse result of exonerating
the State of the oyster lessees' damagings claim, yet holding the
170. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text in which the argument is
advanced that any action for damages resulting from a public project or works
constructed for a public purposes must necessarily be a constitutional damaging
action unless the project has been conducted negligently. The one possible
exception was damages caused by a public project constructed on a site not
acquired through formal expropriation, and this exception would only apply if
A venal were not deemed to eliminate Chaney's formal expropriation determination.
171. See supra note 153.
172. For an illustration of the utter entanglement of the two orders of decisional
principles, see Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Sewerage and Water Bd of City of New
Orleans, 1998-0495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1999), 753 So. 2d 269.
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State liable for a conventional claim whose foundation has just been
negated by the constitutional result.
The Conclusion's recommendations call for substantial effort
by and cooperation between the Louisiana Supreme Court and
Legislature. I believe the effort would have been justified even
without Avenal. With the Court's elevation of the constitutional
damagings action to new-found prominence, scope, and, likely,
frequency of use, however, failure to undertake the effort will invite
difficulties even more predictable and pervasive.

